The Articles of Confederation failed to provide a substantial enough defense for the protection of states against the interest of foreign powers, and from the confliction of interests in and between states. This failure led to the conception of a national or federalized state. The question of how to correct the problem of a coherently unified defense against foreign power was easily answered with the creation of a national army; but how could this new government protect states’ interests from themselves within the confines of a democratic governmental system? I contend that through the bureaucratization of a federalized system the early American government was able to use the same state based interest that hindered the survival of the confederacy to sustain the feasibility of the newly formed state. .
The blueprint for this bureaucratization can be traced to the Madisonian model of government. In The Federalist Papers, James Madison comes to the realization that ” the latent causes of faction are sown in the nature of man- (Fed 10, 73), the nature to act in favor of his own self-interest. This interest is what caused faction within the confederation and he uses this self interest to serve as the basis for his model of government. The Madisonian model consists of three components: the separation of powers, a system of checks and balances, and auxiliary precautions. Madison’s model diffuses power into three branches of government: executive, legislative, and judicial. .
However, in separating these branches of government Madison does not endow each with equal power. According to Lowi and Schepsle, ” the framers provided for legislative supremacy by making Congress the preeminent branch.”” (99) Madison justifies this uneven theoretical weighting of power by citing the necessary predominance of the legislature in a republican government (Fed 51, 319). The creation of a bicameral congressional system with staggered elections serves as his remedy for this predominance.