In 1901, Voltairine de Cleyre wrote and published her essay, “ Anarchism, ” in an attempt to pass on and in many ways warrant her political beliefs to members of the American populace. Her text asks the inquiry of how it is that her impression of anarchism-that we must “ [ e ] ach choose that method which expresses [ our ] selfhood best, and condemn no other adult male because he expresses his Self otherwise ” -may be employed at the societal degree.[ 1 ]In this manner, each statement embedded within the text leaves its particulars ( in footings of individualistic and societal employment ) to the rights, autonomies, wants, and the authorization of each reader of the text-these single governments, these rights, harmonizing to de Cleyre, can be neither condemned and disallowed ; they can be contained by no policy. We, so, as readers, are provoked to our ain inquiring: how is unity possible in such an lawlessness? What does the prioritization of my “ selfhood ” non let me ; what does it restrict me to? The chief statement of this paper will turn to this specifically: de Cleyre ‘s text is a cognizing invitation to the reader for the geographic expedition of the ego, and, finally, the deification of its ain authorization. I will reason that de Cleyre ‘s essay works to pin down itself in this impression of selfhood, a impression that is inherently ( and, by de Cleyre, true ) entirely, and in this manner operates merely in a manner that renders it incapable of working explicitly at the societal degree.
As I have said, de Cleyre ‘s text is really much a call to action ( and, possibly ironically, leftist, in this manner ) ; it is a push on her readers, one that would take them toward the inquiry of how it is that ultimate single freedom may run within the societal entity. To research this, she inquiries how it is that the freedoms of the person, specifically the worker, are oppressed by their societal maps: “ [ a ] big grouping of workersaˆ¦ has made of the employer a adult male portion, holding involvements hostile to those of his employe [ vitamin E ] s, populating in another circle wholly, cognizing nil of them but as so many units of power. ”[ 2 ]De Cleyre uses this entreaty to the working category to measure and inquire inquiries of economic sciences, peculiarly from the more specified point of views of other nihilists ( socialist, Communist, individualist, and mutualist ) . Using each of these lawless doctrines as looks of the non-anarchic, governmental, and societal point of views of all those runing in society, she implies a certain inquiry for the reader: Where are you, your freedoms as an person, represented in these economic sciences, in the pecuniary units of power on which much your society relies for its ain being? Her inquiries turn specifically to the reader, here ; she addresses the reader externally, in fact, at some points, stating “ this is what Anarchism may intend to you. It means that to me, ” inquiring, so, the inquiry for the reader: What does anarchism, your single autonomy, mean to you?[ 3 ]Basically: what does de Cleyre ‘s anarchy tantrum into and run with the reader ‘s “ selfhood ” ?
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This is in many ways one of the more demanding constituents of de Cleyre ‘s text. It addresses and argues for ( 1 ) the easy imaginable subjugations of an single attempting to run within a societal degree and ( 2 ) this “ selfhood, ” the self-importance and the about touchable authorization of each populating single over himself-then, holding to an extent provoked this credibly legitimate authorization, it leaves what the reader should make with his autonomy in his ain custodies, stating that he must merely “ condemn no other adult male because he expresses his Self otherwise. ”[ 4 ]There is an interesting rhetorical device in this: she gives small reply to the inquiries we most want reply to in an essay of anarchism. It is these inquiries that the reader is left with, and in this manner is responsible for. Such inquiries are: if it can be said that the sentiments of persons are countless to the point that it can be said no two persons are of the same head, how is the sentiment of the person sustainable when applied at the societal degree? Can unity be in lawlessness? If non, are we to see this advancement however? And so, is it even possible for us to divide ourselves entirely-for the interest of our selfhood, our freedom-from all other signifiers of authorization? What if our selfhood determines that it is willing to give a spot of itself for the protections of an entity, a separate authorization, that will in many ways quash it?
De Cleyre ‘s text appears instead witting of the inquiries it is raising in its reader, and, in attachment to its ain belief system, is reasonably selective in the inquiries it does and does non reply. Fundamentally, de Cleyre claims that the purpose of anarchism is non merely the geographic expedition of the ego, non merely the freedom to travel beyond fright and usage, but the “ freedom to the psyche as to the organic structure, -in every aspiration, every growing ” .[ 5 ]This is foundational to what I have stated is de Cleyre ‘s chief statement of the text, that we “ [ vitamin E ] ach choose that method which expresses [ our ] selfhood best, and condemn no other adult male because he expresses his Self otherwise. ”[ 6 ]She argues for a certain capableness of integrity in this, even depicting a method of economic operation that would fulfill her statements against other economic signifiers discussed above: “ aˆ¦a status in which all natural resources would be everlastingly free to all, and the worker separately able to bring forth for himself sufficient for all his vital demands, if he so chose, so that he need no regulate his working or non working by the times and seasons of his chaps. ”[ 7 ]However, the inquiries of economic sciences, and even the inquiry of integrity, seem secondary, even superficial, to de Cleyre ‘s primary statement in the text of the legitimacy of single authorization. It is the ego of her readers that de Cleyre is after ; her impression of how all these free egos must run ( operation and action being, I believe, synonymous with the look of the ego ) is subservient to the point of views of these egos, is subservient to their ain undeniable volitions.
The part of her text-remarkably, the individual sentence-that addresses the ego most straight is every bit much argumentative as it is rhetorical and poetic:
Once and forever to recognize that one is non a package of well-regulated small grounds bound up in the front room of the encephalon to be sermonized and held in order with copy-book axioms or moved and stopped by a syllogism, but a bottomless, bottomless deepness of all unusual esthesiss, a swaying sea of experiencing wherever expanse strong storms of unexplainable hatred and fury, unseeable deformations of letdown, low wane of beastliness, quivering and shivering of love that drives to madness and will non be controlled, hungering and significances and sobbing that smite upon the interior ear, now first set to listen, as if all the unhappiness of the sea and the bawling of the great pine woods of the North had met to cry together at that place in the silence hearable to you entirely.[ 8 ]
All statements of the text, the chief statement particularly, work to formalize this self-exploration, which, as de Cleyre states it, is free of the authorization of others ( the copy-book axioms ; the syllogisms ; the sermonizing forces ; even the encephalon, the organic structure itself ) and reliant on the ego ( where, it seems here, peculiarly emotions-rage, letdown, beastliness, even love-gather ) , the silence, as she states it, with our ain silence hearable merely to ourselves. De Cleyre ‘s anarchism, I believe, can be reduced ( if you can name it that, sing the length ) to this one sentence-and it is obligated to no more than this one sentence ( in that the ego is obligated merely to the ego ) . While the statements of de Cleyre ‘s essay cogwheel in many ways toward the manner each ego, as she defines it, may run within the societal entity, it is the ego and the ego entirely that her doctrine is concerned with. She, I would believe, would be evidently cognizant of this. Therefore it is suiting, if non to the full warranted by her ain statement, that de Cleyre ‘s doctrine does non explicitly reply to a societal policy that might let her anarchism, as it has nil to make with societal policy at all. These inquiries, the inquiries she knows the reader will inquire, are returned to the reader unanswered, and, from de Cleyre ‘s statement, were unanswerable to get down with. Harmonizing to Cleyre, our actions as persons can non be condemned or limited ; hence, whatever policy we should choose-in line with de Cleyre ‘s impression that in may harm the autonomy of another or not-is, in many ways, provided for by de Cleyre ‘s very impression of “ denial of authorization over the person. ”[ 9 ]
These inquiries of societal policy would besides be inquiries in the heads of de Cleyre ‘s coevalss ; and I think that she uses her essay, specifically in so far as she names the denominations of anarchism, to turn to, about closely, those listening. Anarchism, as a political doctrine, is ( as are all political doctrines ) capable of being broken into smaller, more specific religious orders ( in the instance of the early portion of de Cleyre ‘s essay, socialist, Communist, individualist, and mutualist ) . When she mentions these classs of anarchism, I think that it is her attempt to-hoping she has caught the reader, or caught the extremist head of the reader-directly mention these religious orders of anarchism and distinguish them from hers. In this manner, so, she becomes in slightly more capable of turning the reader to her about asocial doctrine, which, in her classifications and deconstructions ( about ) of the doctrines on which anarchism has been founded, about automatically allows her ain doctrine to run ( in the head of the reader ) as an development, a patterned advance from those doctrines and philosophers on which her ain ideas are in some manner founded, or which they are influenced by.
She is in many ways externally admiting her history, the foundations of her philosophies-and she goes to far as to, subsequently in the text, name these minds: “ There is Tolstoy, -Christian, non-resistant, artistaˆ¦ . There is John Most-old, work-worn, with the weight of prison old ages upon himaˆ¦ . There is Benjamin Tucker-cool, self-contained, criticalaˆ¦ . There is Peter Kropotkinaˆ¦ . [ T ] here is George Brownaˆ¦ . ”[ 10 ]And before even calling these people, she tells her audience that we must give a certain grade of respect to these persons, insomuch as, harmonizing to her ain doctrine, we must give respect to each human, each ego that exists in the universe: “ This excessively is go throughing. I say this: all methods are to the single capacity and determination. ”[ 11 ]Still, in her really recognition of her ain history, the history that has brought her to compose “ Anarchism, ” there is an undertone, a privation expressed in this cognition and acknowledgment of the ephemeral nature of context and of history and of idea, a privation that, for the intent of her essay, would wish to divide itself from histories, and, alternatively, would “ claim new freedoms, since the old 1s are rendered void and null by the present. ”[ 12 ]As opposed to a more historical development of anarchism, de Cleyre ‘s doctrine develops more into a arrested development of a kind-one that keeps a pes in the kingdom of societal idea, and another really to a great extent braced the kingdom of the ego. Her doctrine begs the reader, in a manner, to internalise his topographic point in society, in history, even, so that the reader is pass oning with de Cleyre ‘s doctrine and de Cleyre ‘s doctrine merely ; she, in this manner, would look to desire to restrict the reader to his or her ain selfhood, to carefully and innocently capture them at that place, so that ideas of political relations and authorization encroach on the reader ‘s ego ( and to divide the reader from the more popular impression that she or he is in some manner inherently a member of this political system, non merely an person on its ain ) .
However, every bit much as de Cleyre ‘s essay seems to admit and at the same time try to prise itself and its reader off from its and their ain history, elements of audience in de Cleyre ‘s essay really to a great extent pull on an affected misgiving of authorization that, in my research, I associated with one specific ( and possibly unsurprising ) historical event: the Haymarket matter. Paul Avrich, in his life of de Cleyre, describes the event:[ It ] began on May 3, 1886, when the Chicago constabulary fired into a crowd of strikers at the McCormick Reaper Works, killing and injuring several work forces. The undermentioned eventide, the nihilists held a protest meeting near Haymarket Square. Toward the terminal of the meeting, which had proceeded without incident, rain began to fall the crowd started to scatter. The last talker, Samuel Fielden, was reasoning Hs reference when a contingent of constabulary marched in and ordered the meeting to be closedaˆ¦ At that minute a bomb was thrown. One police officer was killed and about 70 were injured, of whom six subsequently died. The constabulary opened fire on the crowd, killing at least four workers and injuring many more.
Who threw the bomb has ne’er been determined. What is certain, nevertheless, is that the eight work forces who were brought to test, Albert Parsons, August Spies, George Engel, Adolph Fischer, Louis Lingg, Samuel Fielden, Oscar Neebe, and Michael Schwab, were non responsibleaˆ¦ . Yet all eight were found guilty, the finding of fact being the merchandise of perjured testimony, a jammed jury, a colored justice, and public hysteriaaˆ¦ . [ On ] November 11th, Parsons, Spies, Engel, and Fischer were hanged.[ 13 ]
I mention this event by great step because Avrich names it as a finding factor in de Cleyre ‘s original bend to the doctrine of anarchism: “ The Haymarket affair-the unfairness of the test, the savageness of the sentences, the character and bearing of the defendants-fired the imaginativeness of many immature dreamers and won more than a few to the nihilist cause. Among them was Voltairine de Cleyre. ”[ 14 ]I besides mention the Haymarket matter because of the heavy accent on the authorization of economic sciences and the economic system, and the about unfastened reference, so, to the working category ( or, truly, to the working category person ) that de Cleyre ‘s prose at the beginning of her essay seems oriented toward for a clear audience. As I have known it, the alarming and public nature of the Haymarket matter worked to do it a sort of historical case in point for misgiving, if non hatred, of a authorities whose actions oppressed-to the point of murder-the free address and assembly of its people. In this, and specifically in combination with the abundant formation of trade brotherhoods in America at the clip of de Cleyre ‘s authorship, the working category person is in many ways implicit: their causes, their freedoms warrant a topographic point for them in the consideration of de Cleyre ‘s audience. Further, during the clip de Cleyre was composing “ Anarchism, ” she was populating in Philadelphia “ distribut [ ing ] anarchist literature at brotherhood meetingsaˆ¦ in malice of relentless torment from the constabulary ” ; in fact, she wrote letters depicting her fear at the idea of an incident over her ain cause and for the similar causes of others, chiefly “ concerned with the destiny of her Free Society companions, [ and ] fearing a repeat of Haymarket. ”[ 15 ]
My reading is that the event of the Haymarket matter sheds light on two facets of Voltairine de Cleyre ‘s essay, in that ( 1 ) it establishes a possibly slightly cloudy, but still clearly and tangibly emotional, persona for de Cleyre and ( 2 ) it identifies one member of her essay ‘s audience in peculiar: the propertyless person of the early 1900s. It is such an event as the Haymarket affair-an event that would hold needfully informed the mentality of the American people ( peculiarly the more extremist American individual ) in footings of unfairnesss within the American government-around which both de Cleyre and her coevalss, peculiarly those of the working category, could beat up and happen common land. And while I will non state that de Cleyre goes so far as to work Haymarket in order to derive understandings from her readers, I do non see how such an impacting societal event would non inherently prolong such sympathies-long plenty, at the really least, for such a reader as the propertyless person of 1901 to entertain de Cleyre before discrediting her ( which may non so easy be said among those who, with clip, have forgotten the Haymarket matter ) .
Rhetorically, de Cleyre efforts to unify this small “ quaking balance ” of her ain in a figure of ways.[ 16 ]For me, the most dramatic operations of this are in the construction of her essay. She begins with a treatment of two “ liquors abroad in the universe, -the spirit of Caution, and the spirit of Dareaˆ¦ of Quiescenceaˆ¦ of Unrest ; ” or, “ the spirit of Immobility [ and ] the spirit of Change. ”[ 17 ]This, in kernel, efforts to put a tone-a character, even-for the text: a tone of alteration, of advancement. This, in a manner, can work to pitch a reader, excite a reader for the alterations to come ; it exploits ( non needfully negatively ) the wants of the reader, and the alterations the reader may desire to see those primary wants satisfied. There is an audience, here, excessively, for de Cleyre-one in peculiar: the working category persons of her clip. While this essay does non at all bound itself needfully to this audience, it is them that de Cleyre most consciously references ( and it does non look like an improbable move on her portion, as such a category, so and now, are most normally associated with the demands cardinal to alter and revolution ) . She so works to turn to the predicament of the working category person from an economic point of view, another structural move interesting for what it provides to her statement ( once more, even her character ) : here, she is able to talk factually and literally, utilizing this economic treatment ( which I have called in above paragraphs more superficial to her accent on the ego ) to ease her manner, her statement, into the more abstract and poetic facets foundational to her statement. In footings of construction, the actual, here, becomes a hook for the abstract. She is able to entice in ( though this sounds more maniacal than I would wish it to ) her audience with these more factual beds of her argument-expressing here non merely a appreciation on the actual fortunes of political subjugation, but the fact that she as an person, as a author, as a character, is a adult female who knows what she ‘s covering with ( every bit good as what her readers, specifically the working category person, is covering with-additionally and peculiarly with the event of the Haymarket matter ) .
Again, utilizing this as a manner to jump her text into the poetic and emotional abstract-the undefinable ego, the meat of her argument-she has our attending and is able to in some ways deflect it ( once more, non to give this a negative intension ) with the matter-of-fact contemplations that mark the terminal of her essay. This is where she wants us, as readers, and one time we have arrived, the text opens itself up to us, in a manner, doing a distinguishable passage from the character of de Cleyre as an educated adult female with political statements to a human adult female with emotional and about metaphysical supplications ; and all of this begins, for de Cleyre, with an look of close alleviation, that specifying “ Ah ” that starts it all: “ Ah, one time to stand unflinchingly on the threshold of that dark gulf of passions and desires, one time at last to direct a bold, straight-driven regard down in the volcanic Me, one time, and in that one time, and in that one time everlastingly to throw off the bid to cover and fly from the cognition of that abysm, -nay to make bold it to siss and hum if it will, and do us compose and shudder with its force. ”[ 18 ]I believe I can state it is suiting, in footings of de Cleyre ‘s statement, that such alleviation does, with the courage of de Cleyre ‘s character in the above lines, run into a frighteningly-described pandemonium and effort to use itself at that place. It is this that she wants from her readers: to stand with her at that place, at the threshold of their ain ego, their “ Me, ” to courageously come in the pandemonium, accept the pandemonium, and use what we find, as pandemonium, to our ain societal entity.
Can we? De Cleyre does non cognize, but seems to give her readers an confidence of religion. I can state, at least, I surely do non cognize either. In a manner, de Cleyre ‘s text has prepared me-the reader-for this, and leads her reader to this with intent ( as I have said, the inquiries that the reader most want answered in the text she does non give, as it would conflict with the very impressions she is seeking to show ) . While de Cleyre ‘s essay is so much about, implicitly and straight, the application of her version of lawlessness, this extreme freedom, to the societal entity, the essay is besides as much-if non more-concerned with the selfhood of the reader, and with the impression that the reader should confront it. This is what the construction of Voltairine de Cleyre ‘s text has led me to. And she seems to hold given me some tools, along the manner: for one, her character has shown and insinuated to me that in big portion a certain sort of courage and intelligence are required in this anarchistic geographic expedition of a ego ; she has appealed to my humanity every bit good, or truly my humanity, oppugning me and holding me inquiry what autonomy, what authorization is supreme, and who it must belong to ( as opposed to what ) ; and she has appealed to my optimism, her character being so filled with it, apparently, so that I might maintain optimism near and at manus, should I profess to her essay and thrust at my ain geographic expedition. But still, for me ( and, I think, most readers ) , there is the inquiry of what we are to make with these egos of ours, whose autonomies should be so incapable of misdemeanor that no other authorization might adhere them. Integrity, I think, is what this is. And it is apparent in many parts of de Cleyre ‘s text ; in fact, the text itself is implicitly grounds to the impression that unity-even in the autonomy of a self-driven anarchy-has as equal an importance as the ego. Her concluding lines, are, after all, concerned with our interactions with other egos, stating that we must reprobate no other person who expresses his or her “ Self ” in a mode contrary to ours. I do non cognize how she could afford us this privation, this belief, without some sense of integrity being at manus, or at least possible. Does she non desire us, after all, to stand with her at the threshold of our ain ego and understand, to see, to cognize, what she believes we must, as a collective?
A big portion of this could be seen even as an issue of the nature of linguistic communication itself. I have said that Voltairine de Cleyre ‘s text is really much a call to action, even to weaponries, a push toward the impression of unfastened credence and integrity made capable by the understanding the of the ego ; and while I see this, still, to be the instance, I can admit that “ Anarchism ” has in a really minimum manner armed us, or even told us who we are contending. Once ( and everlastingly? ) we have worked to understand our egos, how does what we have found work to tie in itself with the impressions of capableness and brotherhood interior of a human system? Equally much as authorities is a ordinance of people, linguistic communication is a ordinance of ideas. Do we be in this system, speak in this system, plead in this system, merely to happen it oppresses us?
In Beyond Good and Evil, Friedrich Nietzsche provides readers with a review of the obliquity of linguistic communication, asseverating that every action is, linguistically, associated with a “ ego, ” an “ I, ” that works to presuppose a figure of things-that the “ I ” in inquiry is the 1 who is moving, that any act “ is an activity and the consequence of a being who is considered the cause, that there is an ‘I, ‘ ” and so on.[ 19 ]While his work furthers to review the ways that linguistic communication implies Kantian impressions that the “ I ” is a psyche ( a edifice block of God, basically ) , it is this simple impression, this misgiving of linguistic communication as a system, that I would wish to most concentrate on. I do non assume to cognize what de Cleyre thought or would hold thought of Nietzsche ‘s work, but I do see her statement as being syllogistically relevant to Nietzsche ‘s: in the same manner that Nietzsche would state that the lingual “ I ” is non a proper look of the his impression of the existent ego, neither is de Cleyre ‘s impression of a political “ I ” a proper look of her impression of the existent ego.
What does this mean for human systems? What does it intend for a individual to take on the forfeits linguistic communication might do of idea, merely in order to pass on? Does this in some manner disrepute linguistic communication? Furthermore, is our communicating, so, non our ain? Does it belong alternatively to some other authority-to linguistic communication itself-which, like authoritiess such as de Cleyre thinks them, merely rupture off at and suppress the selfhood of idea? Should we so look inward, find ourselves in and despite all of the synthesis of linguistic communication, and interruption from it? And so? Should we look to our neighbours, besides silent, besides pass oning nil, and cognize, and cognize obviously that they are at that place excessively, in their ain true selfhoods of idea, and think that this is good, or good plenty?
I am non concerned with how linguistic communication is incapable, but how it is ineluctable. Any single I see communicates something to me, a little something, a half-truth, even in silence and skip. Further, I do non see linguistic communication as delusory, as Nietzsche does, but as a clean entity: “ I ” does non needfully presume anything. If I say “ I, ” and I do non cognize whether or non I or God exist, so the “ I ” I am talking of implies the being or non-existence of neither ( the same holds true if I hear it ) . How, though, does this use to authorities? Socialization, the forfeit of the true ego for the care of a unit of egos, is something I have known all my life. And while these forfeits have ne’er amounted to anything so violent or inhumane as those of the Haymarket matter, I can see the scruples and subjugations of authorities on persons much in the manner that I can see the scruples and subjugations of linguistic communication on idea: that it is an effort, at least that, an effort, in many ways ineluctable, of a organic structure of egos, conducted by egos, and obligated by egos to do good on what it has been made for.
True, it could be said that the loss or subjugation of life, of people, is more important than the losingss or subjugations of idea. ( Or: true, it could be said the subjugations of a idea are more important than a loss of life. Or: true, it could be said that the loss of one is the equivalent to the loss of the other. ) Possibly linguistic communication and authorities, even as two man-made human systems, are non to the full correlate. But de Cleyre says, in her essay: “ to see, to cognize, to experience to the utmost, -and so to look at one ‘s chap, sitting across from one in the street-car, so decorous, so good got up, so nicely combed and brushed and oiled and to inquire what lies beneath that platitude exterior, -to image the cavern within him which someplace far below has a narrow gallery running into your ownaˆ¦ . ”[ 20 ]In the terminal, “ Anarchism ” is every bit much a call for integrity as it is for alteration or selfhood. But all this is free from policy, from governmental authorization, and in many ways, free from the societal entity at all. There is this wondering, alternatively, this inquiring, and so the guess of what you have found in your ain ego linking someplace to all other persons as good. But, left to its ain devices, I find de Cleyre ‘s text to be stuck at that place in that silence hearable to her alone, and incapable, by her ain admittance, of replying where that ego might be placed, every bit far as the societal spectrum is concerned. It is no mystifier to me that that really long, really beautiful sentence that I quoted earlier in this paper ends on the word “ entirely. ” There is a solitariness, I believe, that de Cleyre ‘s text has discovered in its focal point on self-exploration, and on the autonomies found in the ego that must be preserved ( above all else ) . And it is in many ways the battle of her essay to bind that solitariness, that self, back into the societal domain. Does she carry through this? As I have said before, she can non ; she can give her beliefs, but must go forth those of her readers to her readers, and must, for the interest of their egos ( to the full acknowledged or otherwise ) let them wholeheartedly. This is the inquiry, for me, that the text leaves unreciprocated: how can this solitariness of the ego preserve itself-its find, its liberty-in the face of the societal collective? Other than acknowledging such a solitariness, as de Cleyre says, in “ one ‘s chap, ” I do non see how it can ( can such a acknowledgment brand for an statement of integrity, or does it merely further isolate persons to their egos, ever tunneling and sometimes acknowledging? ) . Voltairine de Cleyre ‘s text, to me, centres itself, its political privileging, its statements, its character, to each ego in the universe, deniable by no other authorization than itself-and in this manner, each ego is entirely, in its ain privileging incapable of the integrity it finally and really strives for. This is what anarchism may intend to you. It means that to me.
However, based on my ain judgements, I can non reprobate it for this. True, in its ain privileging of the self Voltairine de Cleyre ‘s “ Anarchism ” holds so close, it is in many ways incapable of the integrity it strives for. It is a system, after all ; it is a linguistic communication, a clean entity, pass oning nil as, at the same time, it is capable of pass oning everything. I can state that it is, even in silence and skip, calculable as this sort of a communicating, a half-truth ; I can state that even no authorities is inescapably authorities. Possibly this is the message of “ Anarchism ” : in all this muss of systems, all this quantifiable loss and subjugation and fury, all this incapableness, this certainty and uncertainness and agnosticism, there is ( possibly? ) a ego, a busy small worker inside and made of each of us, each traveling its ain unusual manner, each working indefatigably to outline or amend a system-a life-each with the hope that one twenty-four hours, after all of this work, we might happen that that life, that system reflects us utterly-just one time, or everlastingly ; but absolutely.