At the morning of the 20th century, while the universe was sing a polarisation in political and economic contexts, Colombia ‘s economic system woke up into an enlargement of its primary goods exports. Oil, emeralds, java and bananas were cardinal elements of this development. Globally, liberalism was being recognized as a prima economic, political and philosophic system in most western states, for its recognition of civil autonomies and resistance to any sort of absolutism from disintegrating monarchies of the clip. On the other manus, the Communist triumph over three centuries of hegemonic monarchy regulation in Russia and Lenin ‘s reading of the Marxist theoretical account brought another option to societal and economic organisation. This theoretical account communalized the societal agencies of production, going at the clip a major challenge to the emerging capitalist powers in the consolidation of their power.
Banana markets were chiefly gathered in the European continent and North America, but it was the extraordinary growing of urban markets in the United States in the last decennary of the nineteenth century, and the concentration of capitals for the needed investing in conveyance and selling, that favored its commercialisation and set the footing for the blossoming of the Banana Empire in Latin America in the first decennaries of the twentieth century ( White, 1978 ) .
At the terminal of the nineteenth century Colombia was a simple mercantile economic system, based non on capital investings but on production of goods by independent makers or direct workers capable to pre-capitalist dealingss ( Moncayo, 2008, p. 93 ) . The state ‘s natural inclination, unluckily relentless until now, was to move as a provider of primary goods for metropolitan states and an unfastened market for consumer goods that were non produced locally.
UFC ‘s spouses ( Lorenzo Dow Baker, Minor C. Keith and Andrew Preston ) built their initial capital by commercializing different sorts of agricultural merchandises during the 2nd half of the nineteenth century ( Agudelo Velazquez, 1989 ) . They achieved their first net incomes purchasing green banana Bunches in Morant, Jamaica, for USD $ 0.20 cents and selling them subsequently in Boston for USD $ 3.00 dollars ( Agudelo Velazquez, 1989 ) . The Banana Empire was built in merely five decennaries, a short period to change over small-scale salesmen into accountants of regional economic systems and the rewards of 1000s of labourers in bring forthing states like Honduras, Jamaica, Costa Rica and Colombia ( White, 1978 ) .
Their influence on societal, political and economic elites in Latin American states would subsequently determine the dyslogistic term “ Banana Republics ” ( Bucheli, 2004 ) for states under the great power of the UFC. The company managed to rule 77 % of world-wide banana exports in 1910 ( Agudelo Velazquez, 1989 ) , a great commercialisation cyberspace in the United States in Europe, and a fleet of 86 ships ( the alleged white fleet ) by 1928. Ships were equipped with the most advanced infrigidation engineering available which allowed them to travel fruit supply from one part to another harmonizing to the most convenient market possibilities. The transit and commercial monopolies in their banana enclaves made them able to import and export extra goods every bit good, act uponing local economic systems and even cardinal authoritiess ( White, 1978 ) .
Arrival of the UFC to ‘Magdalena Grande ‘
Before the reaching of UFC in Magdalena an ebullient rain forest of course irrigated by 100s of rivers, watercourses and brooks nourished by the thaw Waterss generated in the Snow Mountains of the “ Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta ” covered the full part. Agricultural production was dedicated to local ingestion, and the boundaries between private and public belongingss remained vague, while the demand for land was minimum due to the subsistence strategy prevailing in the zone. The lone industry was timber development to supply fuel wood and building stuff to the nearest metropoliss, Barranquilla, Cienaga and Santa Marta ( Agudelo Velazquez, 1989 ) .
The banana concern did non get down with the UFC. In 1887 Local Magdalena enterprisers associated with Colombian emigres to the United States foremost attempted big graduated table banana production, despatching the first export trade from Santa Marta to the port of New York in 1891. Their scarce experience in the transit and storage of bananas, nevertheless, caused immense losingss that forced the new enterprisers to sell portion of their lands to pay the tremendous debts. The purchaser of their lands turned out to be a existent estate concern, Colombian Land Company, belonging to Minor C. Keith, one of the laminitiss of the UFC ( Viloria, 2009 ) .
In 1897, the house monopolized the purchase of cultivable lands ( 5,500 hectares ) on both sides of the railroad line between Aracataca and Santa Marta. The fiscal and organisational capacity of companies controlled by Minor C. Keith and his spouses brought the necessary capital for concern growing in the part. Magdalena production and exports increased from 75,000 Bunches in 1891 to 485,000 in 1899 ( Viloria, 2009 ) .
Political economic system of banana s
Colombia began the twentieth century immersed in a awful crisis during the presidential term of Jose Manuel Marroquin ( 1900-1904 ) . The state was covering with one of its worst internal struggles ( “ The Thousand Days ‘ War ” 1899-1902 ) that killed 3 % of the state ‘s entire population and was accompanied by a deficiency of entree to international credits, undistinguished degrees of exports and a hyper-inflation of 300 % . Additionally, the state was confronting the loss of the Panama Canal to the United States ( Kalmanovitz & A ; Lopez, 2002 ) .
Rafael Reyes assumed the presidential term ( 1904-1909 ) at such a critical period for Colombia ‘s economic system. Reyes, a man of affairs himself, was possibly the first president to try to use a capitalist economic theoretical account in Colombia ( Kalmanovitz & A ; Lopez, 2002 ) . He focused his authorities program on three basic schemes: constitution of financial monopolies, fiscal stimulation to pull foreign investing, and increased public investing to better substructure in different parts of the state ( Viloria, 2009 ) .
It was a minute of unbelievable growing in the export of big graduated table capitals by Europe and the United States ( White, 1978 ) , and the astonishing birthrate of dirts and strategic location near the port of Santa Marta decidedly attracted the eyes of UFC spouses to the part for farther development of their already turning concern. Therefore, in 1901, with the “ Thousand Days ‘ War ” about to stop, the UFC established operations in Colombia ( Viloria, 2009 ) . The company took advantage of strategic conditions but besides of the low rewards offered in the Magdalena part to set up one of its most of import supply points for the following 30 old ages.
In 1909, pressured by local elites in Magdalena, Reyes granted specific revenue enhancement freedoms for banana production and export ( applicable until 1929 ) which favored the consolidation of big graduated table banana plantations already present in the part and a monolithic growing of the UFC ‘s banana concern. Financial incentives for foreign capital investings were an of import factor in the company ‘s enlargement in Colombia. During Reyes ‘ Presidency ( from 1908 to 1910 ) UFC acquired more than 13,000 hectares near Aracataca and developed its ain irrigation territories ( 148,400 metres ) , subsequently diverting rivers like the Tucurinca.
Land Rush for green gold
The agricultural frontier was besides expanded by Reyes ‘ public land allocation policy which was created to advance new production in unoccupied lands ( Kalmanovitz & A ; Lopez, 2002 ) . Over 12,000 hectares of vacant lands in the Magdalena section were made available to national and foreign investors in agribusiness destined for export. A titling haste was unleashed in the part. Landowners from the Caribbean seashore, investors from other parts of the state and even president Reyes acquired big extensions of land for banana plantations ( Viloria, 2009, pp. 32-33 ) .
New plantations extended to the section ‘s South and by 1912 the municipality of Aracataca, Garcia Marquez ‘ Macondo, was founded as a direct consequence. The railroad was extended from Sevilla to Fundacion to pick up the fruit from freshly opened virgin woods where investors fought over terrains in a frantic haste for plantations and a unsighted greed for wealth. The lifting involvement of Colombian investors non merely concealed the important function of foreign investing in the banana roar but besides the constellation of an export monopoly ( White, 1978 ) . Typical tropical rain forest flora was replaced by eternal rows of banana workss that shortly characterized the part.
In 1915 more than 14,300 hectares were cultivated in the Magdalena section ; 6,050 hectares ( 42 % ) belonged to the UFC and 5,800 hectares ( 40 % ) to peculiar agriculturists besides other banana companies that were easy being absorbed by UFC. By 1920 the sum cultivated country had increased to 30,800 hectares, of which 50 % belonged to the UFC, and during the 1920s an extra 18,000 hectares were incorporated ( Viloria, 2009 ) . The company invested a sum of US $ 70 million in Magdalena by 1921, an extortionate amount for the clip and particularly for a part with scarce development ( White, 1978 ) . The company reported more than US $ 44 million in net incomes at the minute.
Large graduated table operations and the immense capital managed by UFC allowed it to purchase or extinguish any rival in the Magdalena section during the first three decennaries of the twentieth century, as in the instance of Cuyamel and Atlantic Fruit Company in 1928 ( White, 1978 ) . The part therefore experienced an intense enlargement of banana production that reached a 1929 export extremum of more than 10 million roots yearly, from the port of Santa Marta to other continents. Export of Banana 1891-1935.png
Banana exports grew without break from 1901 to 1913 and declined at the beginning of the First World War. Again in 1916 a period of export additions began that ended in 1930, when the company exported about 11 million Bunches merely from the Colombian Banana Zone ( Viloria, 2009 ) . Between 1929 and 1934 a contraction of the international markets and consecutive hurricanes in the part forced the company to diminish plantation countries by 75 % , which were barely recovered subsequently ( LeGrand, 1980 ) .
The high growing in production caused many tensenesss between the different histrions in the part and found its critical point in the monolithic violent death at the Cienaga Square in 1928. Its aggressive policy of land purchasing and appropriation of vacant lands in Magdalena would face the company with provincials, landholders, manufacturers and on occasions with the Colombian governments. But the company established a good interaction with local and national elites which allowed it to keep power in the part for more than six decennaries.
Forms of entree and control over resources and histrions that emerge from the societal dealingss of production
The kineticss of Banana Society and political dealingss
In the 1920s the United Fruit Company ( UFC ) dominated the different domains of economic, societal and political life in the banana zone. No uncertainty that its investings in the Magdalena section led to the outgrowth of profound transmutations in land term of office and societal forms, like denationalization of lands and big graduated table migration to the part. At the same clip the company had to accommodate to the bing “ societal dealingss of production and societal Fieldss of power ” ( Peluso & A ; Watts, 2001 ) in the part, represented in work patterns, societal and political forms and signifiers of land occupancy ( LeGrand, 2008 ) .
Before UFC ‘s reaching in the part, the “ Magdalena Grande ” section, as it was known so, was hardly inhabited ; the capital metropolis of Santa Marta had about 6,000 occupants and the town of Cienaga-second in importance for the region-comprised merely a few fishermen ‘s bungalows. Existing colonies were composed of scattered semi-abandoned colonial “ haciendas ” and little small towns of colonisers on vacant public lands. Circa 1930, at the extremum of the banana roar, Santa Marta ‘s population increased to 30,000 dwellers and Cienaga ‘s to about 40,000 citizens ( Taylor, 1931 ) ( Agudelo Velazquez, 1989 ) .
Joint venture of UFC and conservative elites
The section ‘s elites, chiefly of Conservative party association, lived in the capital metropolis Santa Marta and owned the mentioned huge semi-abandoned and about valueless belongingss located chiefly in Aracataca and the Riofrio zone. On the other manus, the 2nd most of import metropolis, Cienaga, was inhabited by proprietors of medium size belongingss belonging largely to the Liberal Party that did n’t incorporate easy with the demands of the company and that resented the particular intervention the company offered to regional elites ( LeGrand, 2008 ) .
UFC understood really early on the power represented in regional social-economical elites that could act upon other domains of the national political power. Obviously the company favored business communities belonging to such elites, as a manner to derive their support in times when they had to negociate with regional and cardinal authoritiess or imperativeness broad enterprisers in the ulterior procedure of monopolisation ( Viloria, 2009 ) . One of the richest households of the part, who signed production understandings with the UFC in 1908, received company loans at low rates to purchase extra lands that were subsequently acquired by UFC at convenient monetary values. The household pressured the cardinal authorities to allow revenue enhancement freedom for banana production until 1929 ( Viloria, 2009 ) .
Traditional affluent households usually benefited from company credits at low involvement, purchase of lands at low-cost monetary values or subsequent contracts of estates given in disposal and purchase contracts of banana production ( LeGrand, 2008 ) ( White, 1978 ) . Members of these households occupied high places both in the company and in the authorities of Magdalena and Colombia in general ( Viloria, 2009 ) ( White, 1978 ) , so the confederation was of common benefit for both parts.
UFC strengthened its power in the part through associations that sometimes resulted in hideous and obnoxious fortunes. UFC employees at the same time operated as Departmental Assembly deputies, making clear struggles of involvement. As a consequence of these associations, representatives of the Ministry of Industries detected in 1924 that of 35,400 hectares of the state ‘s vacant lands, 32,9000 were acquired irregularly by the UFC ( Viloria, 2009 ) ( White, 1978 ) .
These facts demonstrated the failing of the province and the company ‘s power of corruptness, one of the features that remain until now in enclave parts like Magdalena.
Disputes between the UFC and Renegade progressives
Company dealingss with the broad “ ladino ” of Cienaga were non at all affable. Several times they attempted to subscribe understandings with UFC rivals to obtain better conditions in crop purchases ; nevertheless, they were ever blocked by the power of the company that maintained control of the ports ( White, 1978 ) . In the fruit choice procedure Cienaga ‘s manufacturers were subjected to even stricter controls than the remainder of the agriculturists ( LeGrand, 2008 ) .
Banana was an highly unpredictable concern, and the manufacturers had to vie to acquire the company to purchase the most measure of fruit, due to the changeless alterations in market demand and the breakability of fruit to be kept in storages. It is calculated that merely two tierces of the fruit produced would be bought for export, the remainder would be rejected. But for oppositions to the banana government, the company rejected between 60 % and 70 % of their crop ( Viloria, 2009 ) .
UFC took advantage of these tensenesss and divided manufacturers to keep its power ( White, 1978 ) . Imbalanced dealingss with the company every bit good as the monopolisation of the concern, substructure, fiscal assets and even nutrient created struggles that would trip the tragic decision of 1928.
Migrant labor and peasant society
During the first two decennaries of the twentieth century growing in the banana economic system attracted non lone investors but a monolithic migration of workers from other parts of the state to the part. Before UFC arrived the about nonexistent occupations available paid around $ 0.30 cents a twenty-four hours, but when the company started production workers were paid around $ 9 pesos per hebdomad. This generated a rise in monetary values local economic system monetary values that would impact dwellers of the part for old ages ( Taylor, 1931 ) . Better wages attracted a big figure of immigrants from other parts of the Caribbean seashore and the interior sections, looking for improved economic conditions and new chances for their households.
Although the plantation wages were better in comparing to other parts of the state, they were far less than in other bring forthing states ( Viloria, 2009 ) . The rewards paid to Colombian workers ( $ 0.50 cents/day ) were low in comparing with Costa Rica and Jamaica, where the mean wage was US $ 1.00/day ( White, 1978 ) .
The fledglings were contracted by UFC and local agriculturists by piecework and for seasonal periods ( White, 1978 ) . This sort of contract allowed “ Mamita Yunay[ 1 ]“ to guarantee that it had no workers in the part, therefore hedging payment of societal security mandated by Colombian Law ( LeGrand, 2008 ) ( Viloria, 2009 ) . In 1925, from an estimated 25,000 workers, merely 5.000 had a direct contract with the UFC ( Viloria, 2009 ) . Laborers had to work in rough conditions: long hours and hapless sanitation. ( See Appendix 1 ) .
Not all work forces were constituted by migrators ; some of them were little scale provincials and new colonists that did n’t integrate instantly into the banana industry. Alternatively, during the first old ages of enlargement this peasant society supplied local markets with agricultural merchandises to feed the all of a sudden increased population. Nevertheless at the same they were seasonal workers at the plantations ( LeGrand, 1980 ) . It is possible that UFC may hold expelled colonists non merely because they needed their land but besides because their labour was necessary for the plantations ‘ enlargement ( LeGrand, 1980, p. 240 ) .
This section of society was besides greatly impacted by the installing of commissary shops by the UFC, where the company sold merely imported goods. The system impeded workers from geting local merchandises, as they were paid in verifiers that merely could be redeemed at UFC shops ( LeGrand, 1980, p. 241 ) . This condemned little provincials to lose their supports and lands, go forthing them merely the option to sell their work to last.
Asymmetrical forces on land differences
UFC confronted great clashs with local provincials for the land. As explained before, cultivation enlargement caused a monolithic denationalization of public lands. It generated struggles that led to the expropriation of 100s or possibly 1000s of colonists already populating or late installed in the part ( LeGrand, 1980 ) . Competition caused a rise in belongings monetary values and — as described in the old subdivision — a haste for the best available lands. Many traditional households sought old colonial rubrics in their family trees in which boundaries were ill-defined and claimed as their ain abutting vacant province lands to be sold subsequently to the UFC. The company so accumulated about 60,000 hectares of private belongings. Others sought authorities grants to get down new plantations ( LeGrand, 1980 ) . A territorial clang shortly became inevitable.
The deficiency of boundary elucidations between private and province belongingss was a major cause of struggles and the most affected were as ever the weakest in society: little provincials and new colonists. The province merely intervened when the company began to travel in the way of medium- to large-sized agricultural manufacturers. ( See instance in Appendix 2. )
The bulk of struggle events involved the UFC supported by local governments who constantly used force against provincials who resisted eviction. In these instances armed forces recurred to diverse violent patterns such as combustion of houses, puting imprisonment of household representatives, or puting cowss loose to devour the harvests existent on the belongings ( White, 1978 ) . All this generated strong discontent in the on the job category and the little peasant society against the unfairnesss of authorities and the UFC.
Everyday opposition and the Revolutionary Socialist Party
All the above-named tensenesss generated different signifiers of opposition among colonists, little provincials and workers. At the get downing the colonists resisted the procedures of land trespass, but after the violent events in which armed forces were involved they claimed protection from the cardinal authorities, every bit good as from the tribunals, to continue their rights. Although many of the efforts to support their belongingss were unsuccessful, they generated the strong belief in the rural population that the UFC obtained lands belonging to the province illicitly, and harmonizing to the jurisprudence they were in place to repossess this belongings as subsequently occurred ( LeGrand, 1980 ) .
The first organized efforts in the part began in 1925 with the foundation of the “ Trade Union of Workers of Magdalena[ 2 ]( TUWM ) ” , and subsequently under the influence of the Revolutionary Socialist Party, founded in 1926 ( LeGrand, 2008 ) . The trade brotherhood was influenced by Spanish and Italian immigrants with anarcho-syndicalist thoughts and assembled workers every bit good as little graduated table provincials in the part. Although the trade brotherhood ‘s attempts supported the claims of provincials threatened with eviction by the UFC, its chief attempts were directed towards forming a general work stoppage against the company ( LeGrand, 1980 ) .
After 1929 the banana economic system experimented a deep recession due to the contraction of international markets and consecutive hurricanes in the zone. UFC diminished its activities and 1000s of workers lost their occupations. In this state of affairs, many of the unemployed who had been provincials before assumed an violative attitude, busying UFC belongingss to turn subsistence harvests. The company lost about 9,500 hectares between 1930 and 1935 that they ne’er recovered once more. Displacement was reversed because many of the encroachers claimed the belongings from the authorities as legal colonists, harmonizing to Colombian land belongings regulations ( LeGrand, 1980 ) .
Slaughter of 1928 rejection of symbolic enemy
The 1928 work stoppage was the first organized monolithic mobilisation of the rural population in the part. Between 25,000 and 32,000 workers ( Viloria, 2009 ) participated in the arrest of company activities for more than three hebdomads, until the tragic result of the morning of 6th December 1928 when the Colombian ground forces fired against an unarmed population whose chief motive was to claim better working conditions and a infinite for provincials ‘ nutrient cultivation. It marked a remarkable event in the Colombian corporate memory, described by Garcia Marquez in his book One Hundred Old ages of Solitude.
The slaughter was greatly influenced by the polarisation between traditional democracies and communist governments. Most of the messages revealed by the Ministries, the U.S. Embassy and UFC would convey about the fatal stoping. A complete analysis is shown in Appendix 3.
What is true is that hegemonic histrions transformed the initial image of a labour struggle to a job of war. Although the beyond doubt purpose of the socialist ‘s motion to spur an rebellion seems apparent, this was far from being “ guerilla warfare. ” Therefore, the Army ‘s reaction was disproportionately overdone: in utilizing machine guns against strikers who “ performed civil opposition actions and fraternisation with the military personnels to demilitarize them, ” abducing loss of authorization was non adequate statement for the slaughter ( Archila, 2008, p. 167 ) .
Let us analyse what happened one hundred old ages after the enlargement of the Banana Regime in the Valley of the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta.