Gaynor v. Allen: What is negligence.

Table of Contentss

Introduction

Methodology

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE POSITION OF LAW PRIOR TO THE CASE:

FACTS OF THE CASE:

THE LEGAL ISSUE RAISED IN THE CASE

DECISION REACHED BY THE Court

Opinion

Arguments by the complainant

Arguments by the suspect

Judges’ responses to these statements

Reasons adduced by Judgess for making the decisions

Decision

BIBILOGRAPHY

Introduction

The instance of Gaynor v. Allen [ 1 ] revolves around the rule of carelessness. The suspect was fundamentally negligent towards his responsibility to take proper attention. The suspect was a constabulary constable who, while in chase of a hurrying auto knocked down the complainant. The suspect further argued that the complainant was guilty of contributory carelessness. Let us analyze a little more about what carelessness and contributory carelessness is.

What is Negligence?

“Negligence” is the breach of legal responsibility by skip to make something which a sensible adult male would make or by making something which a sensible adult male would non make. It is the disregard of attention which jurisprudence requires. [ 2 ]

What is Conducive Negligence?

Conducive carelessness is the carelessness in non avoiding the effect of carelessness of some other individual here, the complainant, by his privation of instance, contributes to the harm caused by the carelessness of the suspect. [ 3 ]

These are the 2 two rules on which the instance revolves around.

The justice in this instance was: McNair, J. M. D. Sherrard for the complainant. P. M. O’Connor for the suspect.

Solicitors: D. J. Freeman and Fraser ( for the complainant ) ; Ponsford and Devenish, Tivendale and Munday ( for the suspect )

Methodology

• Primary beginning:

I referred the All England Reporter ( 1959 ) volume 2 to do this undertaking.

• Secondary beginning:

To do this undertaking I referred to books such as Law of Torts by R.K. Bangia and Law of Torts by J. Usha.

I referred to online databases such as jstor.com, manupatra.com. Last but non the least I’m truly thankful to google.com for assisting me do this undertaking.

I have tried my degree best to adhered OSCOLA type of mention.

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE POSITION OF LAW PRIOR TO THE CASE:

The chief act which revolves around this instance is of Road Traffic act 1934.

Prior to the Road Traffic Act 1934, Road Traffic Act of 1930 was into force.

As per the Road Traffic act of 1930:

• Speed bound for all the motor vehicles was abolished. As a consequence of this a big sum of casualties were witnessed in a individual twelvemonth. Peoples became more careless.
• Hence, the act was amended in 1934.

As per The Road Traffic Act of 1934:

• The act reintroduced the velocity bound for motor vehicles.
• The velocity bound for autos was restricted to 30 stat mis per hr in physique up country.
• This act was reversed every bit early as 4 old ages from the old established act.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

In this instance, Susan Gaynor, the complainant was a province registered nurse. The complainant crossed the Great West Road and Eyot Garden ( her abode ) to the North Eyot Gardens and frailty versa, everyday. This involved traversing the dual carriageway. While traversing the northern carriageway of the Great West Road at Hammersmith, the complainant was knocked down by a automobilist. It was a double carriageway with each carriageway being some 30 pess broad. The complainant was knocked down and injured by a motor rhythm driven by Anne Patricia Allen, the suspect, who was a constabulary constable. The suspect was killed ; hence it would be referred as “the deceased” hereinafter. The velocity bound of the route was 40 stat mis per hr. At the clip of the accident the deceased was siting at 60 stat mis per hr in pursuit of police responsibilities.

Hence, the complainant sued the deceased of amendss for personal hurts sustained and amendss suffered by her when she was knocked down by the deceased on the 29th of March 1958 at the Great West Road, Hammersmith in the state of London. At the clip of the accident the deceased was in the class of his constabulary patrol responsibility. The deceased was siting a bikes owned by the Receiver of Metropolitan Police.

Section 3 of the Road traffic Act provided that the velocity bound was non applicable to the motor vehicles which were in the class of constabularies responsibility or which were being used for constabulary intents. Section 3 of the Road Traffic Act stated that: “the commissariats of any passage or of any statutory regulation or order, enforcing a velocity bound on motor vehicle shall non use to any vehicle on the juncture when it is being used for fire brigade, ambulance or constabulary intents, if the observation of those commissariats would probably to impede the usage of the vehicle for the intent for which it is being used on the occasion.” [ 4 ]

THE LEGAL ISSUE RAISED IN THE CASE

The tribunal from the aforesaid facts derived the inquiries that:

• Whether s. 3 of the Road Traffic Act, 1934, affected the civil liability in regard of a vehicle which was exceed the permitted velocity bound while being used for constabulary intents.

• Whether the complainant was guilty of contributory carelessness.

DECISION REACHED BY THE Court

Opinion

The tribunal held that, the deceased’s civil liability could non be affected by the subdivision 3 of the Road Traffic Act, 1934. The tribunal said that driving at such a velocity on a velocity restricted route in half visible radiation, the deceased was guilty of carelessness.

The tribunal farther said that the relieving proviso of the Road traffic act, 1943 does non measure up the constabulary driver’s condemnable liability in footings of unsafe drive and driving without attending and due attention.

Arguments by the complainant

1. That the accident was due to the deceased’s carelessness.
2. That the asleep drove at the velocity transcending the permitted velocity bound and failed to maintain a proper sentinel.
3. That the deceased failed to brake or take sufficient stairss as to avoid clashing with the complainant.
4. That the deceased failed to maneuver, pull off or command the motor rhythm and the suspect besides failed to blink his beak and sound his horn.

Arguments by the suspect

1. That the complainant was guilty of contributory carelessness.
2. That if the deaths would hold non been moving on official concern and had been driving at 60 stat mis per hr for personal concern so, if would hold been hard for the deceased to get away partial liability, but these fortunes is non applicable in the instance of the deceased here.

Judges’ responses to these statements

After giving thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions, statements and groundss led by parties on record, Judge’s response to these statements were as follows:

1. That it was the usage of the complainant traveling to the Great West Road from the hospital day-to-day. For this she had to traverse the dual carriageway, a individual carriageway was around 30 pess broad. It was divided by a Centre division which was covered by grass and inveighing which was about 4 to 5 pess broad.
2. That the velocity bound on this portion of the route was 40 stat mis per hr.
3. That on the twenty-four hours of the accident, the complainant was returning place from a day’s work at the infirmary. She intended to traverse the route and travel to the island and from at that place to the south side of the route. The complainant observed that the carriageway was clear of traffic on the either sides.
4. That the Great West Road was good illuminated, the lamps were posted on the centre division of the carriageway and on the either sides of the curb of the carriageway.
5. That the complainant had no clear remembrance of the events that followed after the accident.
6. That the motor rhythm is a really powerful machine, capable of velocity of around 70 to 80 stat mis per hr on the Great West Road.
7. That the motor rhythm was traveling somewhat faster than it appeared to be, as the constabulary constable was in a chase of a hurrying motor auto.

Reasons adduced by Judgess for making the decisions

To make the decision of the instance, the justice took the undermentioned facts into consideration.

1. That the motor rhythm was surely traveling faster than the complainant thought it was. It would hold going at a velocity non less than 60 stat mis per hr and the motor rhythm was capable of making a velocity up to 70 stat mis per hr.
2. The justice found out that the deceased was ne’er involved in any constabulary offense ; he farther inferred that the deceased would hold been going at a velocity non less than 60 stat mis per hr and he was going at that velocity in pursuit of his constabulary responsibilities.
3. It these fortunes it was clear by the subdivision 3 of the Road Traffic Act that the deceased was non guilty of condemnable offense.
4. This nevertheless deals merely with condemnable liability of the driver but, the inquiry arise here is whether to what extent the commissariats of subdivision 3 of the Road Traffic Act, 1934 will impact the civil liability of the deceased.
5. It was observed that the relieving commissariats of the subdivision 3 of the Road traffic Act, 1934 does measure up the condemnable liability of the constabulary constable for unsafe drive and driving without appropriate attention, the subdivision 3 is given a rigorous application for condemnable liability and does non impact the civil liability of the deceased in any manner whatsoever.
6. In the concluding opinion the justice said that, the deceased, the driver of the motor rhythm should be judged in precisely the same mode as the jurisprudence would hold judged as any other motor rhythm rider or any other individual. The justice farther said that, the deceased, the driver of the motor rhythm owed certain responsibilities to the public while siting the motor rhythm. He owed the responsibility to sit with due attention and with proper attending without exposing the populace to any kind of unneeded hazard.
7. The 1^stinquiry which was to be answered whether the deceased is to be judged on the criterions of an ordinary driver of the motor rhythm is to be held guilty of carelessness for doing the accident or non. The judge’s reply to this inquiry was yes, the driver of the motor rhythm was negligent. To drive at the velocity of 60 stat mis per hr in a half illuminated country, at a clip in the eventide when it is understood that there may be a batch of walkers on the route who would hold been coming back place. This is itself improper and insecure to sit at such velocity.
8. The 2^neodymiuminquiry which was to be answered was whether the complainant was herself responsible for the accident, if yes so to what extent. To this the justice said that, harmonizing to the grounds from the instance, the complainant walked at medium gait. She stopped at the curb and looked right, and so she started walking to traverse the route. The complainant did non look at her right once more and therefore to this she must bear some duty for the accident.
9. The justice decided the plaintiff’s portion of the duty at one-third and the deceased’s at two-third, and the particular amendss being agreed at ?350.
10. As a consequence of the accident the complainant suffered terrible breaks ; she was admitted to the infirmary for six months. Hence, the justice assed the general harm to ?750 and two-third of the sum was awarded to the complainant.

The opinion was in the favor of the complainant.

Decision

The deceased, the driver of the motor rhythm was a constabulary constable and was in the class of his employment when the accident occurred, though the subdivision 3 of the Road Traffic Act, 1934 exempts ambulance, fire brigade and constabulary from being tried for misdemeanor of velocity bound in peculiar countries ; the constabulary constable was held responsible and found guilty for carelessness as a consequence of which accident occurred. The ground the justice gave for this was that, the deceased owed a responsibility toward the people of and he should’ve been more careful and responsible in driving the motor rhythm. The commissariats of the subdivision 3 Road Traffic Act, 1934 could non be made applicable as the deceased was held guilty of carelessness. The complainant was excessively, held partly responsible for the accident, as she ought to hold looked twice earlier traversing the route to make the island on the south side of the route. The complainant suffered some serious hurts as a consequence of the accident and therefore the justice assed the general harm at ?750.

The opinion justly was given in the favor of Susan Gaynor, the complainant.

BIBILOGRAPHY

Books referred:

1. Bangia R K,Law of Torts( Allahbad Law Agency 2010 ) .
2. Ratanlal and Dhirajlal,Law of Torts( Lexis Nexis 2012 )
3. Usha J,Law of Torts( Usha Law Series 1984 ) .

On-line support:

1. www.manupatra.com
2. www.jstor.com
3. www.legalserviceindia.com

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