The phenomenon of capitalist globalization which has unfolded during the past decennaries has brought approximately unprecedented progresss for the Western universe. Through competitory free market processes, capitalist globalization has led to enormous technological and economic advancement, leting human existences to bask assorted freedoms and chances. Capitalism is hence taken to be the drive force behind socio-economic advancement, and polar to globalization.
In general, capitalist economy is a socio-economic system, in which the production of goods and services and their subsequent market exchange takes topographic point. The productive assets are in private owned ( either separately or jointly ) and the resulting net income, which leads to wealth accretion, is the chief drive force behind economic life. Money is used as a medium of exchange, which determines the distribution form of the productive end product, the degrees of investing and the income derived functions. The function of the province is to set up a legislative system which can vouch private belongings rights of proprietors over the returns of their production. Furthermore, a capitalist construction may be developed in the context of either a strong or a weak province, and may be placed in either an actively participatory or capable political civilization. The province may be a portion of the integrated planetary economic system, or instead remain embedded in a local economic system ( Lane, 2000 ) .
The Cold War epoch dichotomized the argument on the domination of the capitalist system. Once the prostration of the offseting Soviet Union and its Communist government was at hand, capitalist economy became the hegemonic socio-economic system. President Yeltsin and his disposal were convinced that encompassing the neoliberal political orientation of the Washington Consensus[ 1 ]was the exclusive manner towards the newly-formed Russian Federation ‘s economic development. This represented the beginning of a joint attempt by the West and the new Russian authorities to globalize the Russian Federation along the lines of the neoliberal ideal ( Stiglitz, 2002 ) . This involved presenting an Anglo-American type capitalist construction by making goods- , asset- and labour markets, understating the function of the province and its intercession in the economic system and opening the economic system to international competition. Previously government-owned assets had to be quickly privatised in order to organize a self-motivated concern category ( Barnes, 2003 ; Lane, 2006 ) . However, the debut of these neoliberal reforms, and thereby the effort to import an Anglo-American type capitalist construction into Russia, did non ensue in the intended wealth creative activity, democratization and economic stabilization. In fact, a decennary of liberalization left the state weakened, lawless and indebted, non at all comparable to a modern Western capitalist system ( Stiglitz, 2002 ) . It was merely in the 2nd decennary of Russia ‘s passage, after the crisis in 1998 and the alteration of political power, that the economic state of affairs in the state showed marks of betterment as a more favorable concern environment eventually developed ( Letiche, 2007 ; Rosefielde, 2007 ; Sakwa, 2008 ) .
This essay sets out to research the differences between the two opposing decennaries of Russia ‘s passage from a socialist economic system in footings of the province ‘s attack towards economic reform and policy. Placed in the context of globalization, the impact of the state ‘s structural alterations on both SMEs and large concern is put into position. The initial effort to import an Anglo-American capitalist construction did non present the expected consequences, ensuing in the displacement towards a state-led attack to capitalist economy. This has helped Russia set up itself as a more outstanding histrion within the procedure of capitalist globalization and constitutes an of import lesson for passage states sing their development procedure and journey towards capitalist economy.
Soviet union throughout the 90s – Daze therapy and its consequence on Russian concerns
The socialist economic system of the Soviet Union was organised and functioned in ways radically different to capitalist market societies. The province controlled and coordinated all sectors of the economic system. A system of province ownership of all resources and industrial activities was implemented, which did non digest the being of any independent economic units. The authorities had control over employment and pay rates, monetary value degrees and investing distribution ( Rosefielde, 2007 ) . It is obvious that a capitalist category did non be in former Soviet provinces, and the edifice of such a category was a major undertaking to be executed during Russia ‘s passage from communism.
The transmutation of Russia, which started in the early 1990s, was a consciously co-ordinated procedure, evoked and carried out by both domestic and foreign political leaders, who attempted to import an Anglo-American capitalist construction into the state and prosecute neoliberal economic policies. The scheme developed to ‘globalise ‘ Russia was known as ‘shock therapy ‘ , as it signified a rapid and extremist alteration from one economic system to another ( Stiglitz, 2002 ) . Its execution began with the riddance of monetary value controls over goods, taking to quickly make a market economic system. This was to be achieved through price- and trade policy liberalization, which on its portion would excite competition ; and through denationalization, which would make private belongings as the lone successful manner of making inducements for new enterprisers. Meanwhile, the convertibility of the ruble had to be ensured and its value had to be stabilised, connoting rising prices controls and tight financial policy ( Molchanov, 2005 ) . Such was the stabilisation/liberalisation/privatisation programme that was intended to transform Russia ‘s economic and concern life. Overall, province activity was to be brought to a lower limit, while a neo-liberal model of free markets, perfect competition and minimum authorities intercession was to be introduced ( Sachs, 1995 ) .
However, the dissatisfactory result of Russia ‘s transmutation turned out to be a surprise for its optimistic reformists. By the mid-1990s it was already going obvious that the state needed less daze and more therapy. The instant monetary value liberalization led to sky-rocketing rising prices figures, which rapidly robbed people of their nest eggs, asking tighter pecuniary policy by raising the involvement rate ( Stiglitz, 2002 ) . Furthermore, as hyperinflation impoverished the population, the bulk of the Russians could non profit from the 2nd major pillar of the reform – mass denationalization ( Shleifer and Treisman, 2005 ) . In fact, denationalization was a really of import facet of Russia ‘s restructuring, since it was to put the foundations for a market economic system and demand-led production. However, this is where complications arose. First of all, with the bulk of the population being excluded from this procedure, most Russian endeavors were given off to few politically-connected barons ( alleged oligarchs ) ( Rutland, 2005a ) . Second, the gap of the capital markets, which was besides portion of the restructuring programme, allowed the oligarchs to reassign the bulk of their assets to foreign bank histories, since maintaining their money in the state at that point meant doing an improbably hazardous investing in a state which is in deep depression ( Stiglitz, 2002 ) . Indeed, after about a decennary of reforms Russia was riddled with rising prices, corruptness and anarchy and on the brink of a crisis. The authorities was going progressively indebted to the international fiscal establishments ( the IMF and the World Bank ) , however go oning to give away its valuable assets to oligarchs, who on their portion were taking enormous sums of wealth out of the state ( Shleifer and Treisman, 2005 ) .
It becomes obvious from the above analysis that the two societal groups that became the chief histrions in this transmutation procedure ( and were to put the foundations of the antecedently non-existant capitalist category ) were the until-then-dominant administrative stratum and the acquisition stratum. The former consisted of the current political leaders who possessed executive power over economic activities, while the latter was composed of skilled workers and possible enterprisers, who ( while antecedently disadvantaged ) had the possible to go the new capitalist category in charge of Russia ‘s large concerns ( Lane, 2006 ) . As a consequence of the policies employed during the first old ages of passage the administrative stratum was significantly weakened, while the acquisition stratum was both politically and economically empowered. Hence, the latter came to gain the potency for plus ownership and wealth creative activity, which can be identified as the first marks of category involvement within the ‘new ‘ Russian society ( Lane, 2006 ) .
Furthermore, the above procedure demonstrates the extent to which the acquisition stratum strived to emulate the Anglo-American ingestion theoretical account. This suggests that the globalizing inclinations of the neoliberal theoretical account became the major drive force behind Russia ‘s passage from province socialism. Therefore, the procedure of constructing a capitalist Russian society and a propertied category was purely overseen by the international political elites, the US authorities and the IFIs as mediators ( Rosefielde, 2007 ) . Notwithstanding the initial high outlooks, what these foreign and local aspirations resulted in could be approximately described as ‘chaotic capitalist economy ‘ , which bore really small resemblance to the ‘model ‘ Anglo-American capitalist construction ( Lane, 2008 ) . The new societal and economic system that was developed in Russia during the first decennary of passage lacked the support of a solid institutional construction, therefore arousing societal atomization.
As a effect, large-scale private endeavor in the state was characterised by high grades of uncertainness, elect disunity, criminalization, corruptness, and rent-seeking ( Hoff and Stiglitz, 2004 ) . Furthermore, few big corporations had assumed control over a considerable portion of the economic system, including natural resource industries, and even gained political power ( Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005 ) . Despite the barons ‘ rapid acquisition of political and economic power, they failed to win any support from the Russian society. In fact, their legitimacy was instead delicate, given their engagement in lawless patterns, revenue enhancement equivocation and plus denudation ( Hanson and Teague, 2005 ) .
Meanwhile, the reforms after the autumn of the Union lay the foundations of Russian little entrepreneurship, which did non be as an economic activity during the Communist government. Therefore, the first few old ages after the start of the reforms are associated with a considerable rise in the figure of little private concerns in the state. By 1995, little endeavors constituted 65 % of all Russian concerns ( Radaev, 2001 ) . However, the political and economic environment in Russia at the clip was highly hostile to their farther development. Not merely were they neglected by policy shapers ( who were excessively concentrated on macro-economic indexs ) , but the direct effects of the ‘shock therapy ‘ policies created a peculiarly hostile environment for SMEs. High degrees of income inequality, widespread corruptness and the deficiency of regulations and Torahs to extinguish the hazard and uncertainness of the economic and fiscal environment resulted in instead high SME failure rates, farther triping their law-evasive behavior and increasing engagement in the informal sector ( Astrakhan and Chepurenko, 2003 ; Kihlgren, 2003 ) .
Furthermore, since all the invested money had left Russia and people lost their nest eggs due to rising prices, it was peculiarly hard for SMEs to derive entree to necessary support and to transferable concern cognition ( Duflo and Senik-Leygonie, 1997 ) . This left little concerns isolated from both the economic and political domain and devoid of any bargaining power. By the terminal of 1999 there were around 890,000 little[ 2 ]endeavors in Russia. This figure nevertheless has been stable throughout most of the decennary, a cogent evidence for the instead limited development of SMEs at the clip ( Radaev, 2001 ) . Furthermore, the portion of SMEs in the entire figure of employment at the terminal of the 90s was hardly 10 % , while their portion in the entire figure of endeavors was merely 65 % , compared to the reeling 90 % on norm for EU states ( Federal State Statistics Service, 2009 ) . Hence, the marked underperformance of Russian little enterprisers resulted from the deficiency of province support and the enormous economic and political force per unit areas.
Overall, by the terminal of the 90s Russia had undergone enormous economic reform in the signifier of full monetary value liberalization, mass denationalization and withdrawing province intercession. A manner of market capitalist economy was established which, despite the high hopes of both Russian and foreign reformists, well differed from the Anglo-American capitalist constructions. Russia ‘s large concerns had ended up in the custodies of the politically connected oligarchs who assumed ownership over major sectors of the Russian economic system, and engaged in plus denudation, corruptness and political intervention. Furthermore, the development of little entrepreneurship was hampered by the unstable economic environment, while much-anticipated economic growing and development did non happen during the first decennary of passage.
Soviet union in the new millenary – Sign of resurgence
However, after the ’98-crisis and the alteration of political power ( Yeltsin was replaced by president Putin ) , Russia ‘s economic skyline has significantly improved in footings of existent GDP per capita, concern environment and criterion of life ( Estrin, Kolodko and Uvalic, 2007 ) . There are two separate grounds for the positive bend in Russia ‘s economic development at the terminal of the century. First of wholly, the effectual depreciation of the immensely overvalued ruble that took topographic point at the terminal of 1998 can be identified as a really important stipulation for macroeconomic stabilization. This gave manner to a period of recovery, enduring until the beginning of 2000, during which the state ‘s cost-price construction was brought in line with internationally competitory conditions ( Letiche, 2007 ) . Furthermore, during this initial recovery stage and following the currency devaluation, end product was chiefly generated through import permutation. There was a enormous decrease in the sum of imports, accompanied by an increased volume of exports, including non-energy exports. Therefore, by the terminal of 1999 Russia ‘s balance of trade had soared and brought about an every bit rapid addition in maintained net incomes and net incomes. This in bend caused a considerable addition in investing, both in the industrial and the agricultural sectors ( Letiche, 2007 ) .
The 2nd ground behind Russia ‘s economic resurgence is the rapid addition in energy monetary values, which occurred at the beginning of 2000. The combined operation of these two factors – the depreciation of the ruble and the lifting energy monetary values, in the scene of an overall enabling environment provided by the new political disposal allowed for a rapid betterment in the economic conditions in the state throughout the 2nd decennary of Russia ‘s passage. This is reflected in the state ‘s GDP growing rate – it has shown a steady addition from 5.3 % since the terminal of 1998, to 6.3 % in 1999 and the impressive 10.0 % in 2000, eventually bracing at an norm of about 6.5 % during 2000-2005 ( compared to a negative GDP growing rate all throughout the 90s ) ( Letiche, 2007 ) .
Apart from Russia ‘s bettering economic clime, the political and macroeconomic reforms introduced by Putin ‘s presidential term at the terminal of 1999 have deeper deductions for the development of the little every bit good as the big endeavors in the state. It is merely after the 2nd half of 2000 that Russian SMEs became the object of particular policy steps and accordingly assumed a more outstanding and of import function in the economic system ( Rutland, 2005a ) . The figure of SMEs in the state increased quickly and by 2004 amounted to over 8900 1000, which represented 94 % of all endeavors in the state. Furthermore, the portion of SMEs in entire employment had besides reached the well higher degree of 49 % , besides nearing European degrees ( Federal State Statistics Service, 2009 ) . While during the 90s the development of little entrepreneurship was weak and extremely obstructed by the political laterality of the oligarchs, important alterations can be observed under the new disposal. A figure of reforms, specifically aimed at SMEs were introduced to assist small-scale Russian entrepreneurship bit by bit take form. One of the first countries targeted by president Putin was the easiness of puting up a concern. New Torahs were introduced aimed at cut downing the bureaucratic troubles little houses face during the procedures of enrollment, licensing and review, therefore cut downing the set-up waiting clip. However, the most of import and extremist measure taken by the new disposal was reforming the revenue enhancement system, presenting important alterations and decreases to the benefit of little companies ( Rutland, 2005a ) .
On the other terminal of the spectrum, the big oligarch-controlled endeavors such as Gazprom, Lukoil, Severstal, etc. , which antecedently made small sense as concern units, have besides undergone a monolithic transmutation. A series of reforms introduced by the new disposal paved their manner to going functional houses, able to run competitively in an economic environment. First of wholly, the currency devaluation following the 1998 crisis and the overall economic stabilization brought about a new assurance among the concern circles about the ability of the domestic end product to increase. Furthermore, this constituted a signal that carry oning a concern at place is now a more profitable alternate to plus denudation ( Sakwa, 2008 ) . In add-on, the greater political stableness and the stronger leading of president Putin contributed to the positive transmutation of Russian concerns ( Maury and Liljeblom, 2009 ) , even if it was merely the message sent by the reforms programme that had the growth-stimulating consequence, instead than the existent consequences of the reforms. Furthermore, the most important reforms which Putin set out to present about instantly were to significantly better the regulation of jurisprudence, set up a stronger system of revenue enhancement control ( Desai et al. , 2007 ) and alter the relationship between the province and the oligarchs ( Glaeser et al. , 2003 ) . During a meeting between the president and the oligarchs the new regulations of the game were laid out, viz. that the concern barons were allowed to maintain their ( sometimes illicitly ) acquired concerns every bit long as they ran them competitively and did non interfere in province political relations. This resulted in the support of the province ‘s power counterpart the oligarchy and other establishments ( Thompson, 2004 ; Maury and Liljeblom, 2009 ) .
Historically, the lone legitimacy of capitalist economy as a socio-economic construction in which the wealthiest population decile ( the ‘elite ‘ ) can allow an inordinate sum of national income[ 3 ]is that they are able to develop the productive capacity of the economic system by puting back into the system and presenting of import kineticss ( Palma, 2008 ) . During the 90s, Russian oligarchs did non stand for a dynamic capitalist elite, and were in fact instead greedy and unwilling to put back in the economic system ( their plus denudation inclinations are a well-documented fact ) . What Putin achieved through face-to-face meetings was to dispute the oligarchs to present and coerce them to gain their legitimacy, by expatriating the oligarchs out of the political kingdom and restricting them to the economic. In order to stay an oligarchy they had to put back in the economic system and present growing, productiveness and technological transmutation. This is a important going from Russia ‘s economic system in the 90s, and it was achieved by the direct intercession of Putin and his disposal. Such an intercession strongly resembles an autocratic attack of the province towards deciding economic issues, therefore traveling against the bequest of the Washington consensus and the neoliberal ideal. However, alternatively of destructing the oligarchic category, the above reforms in fact succeeded at radically transforming Russian large concerns. Not merely has it increased the figure of the oligarchs and their several wealth, but it has besides placed the Russian economic system on a positive growing way. Furthermore, the nature of the game differs radically from the old decennary, with a stronger and better implemented regulation of jurisprudence[ 4 ]( Desai, et al. , 2007 ; Sakwa, 2008 ) .
State-led capitalist economy
From the above analysis it becomes clear that by liberalizing the economic system, president Yeltsin managed to put the foundations of what resembled a capitalist category, leting the Russian oligarchs to roll up their wealth. However, the signifier of capitalist economy created during the 90s was helter-skelter and lacked an implemented institutional model. Furthermore, the important forces of market competition which were necessary to train the new barons into running legitimate industries good for the state ‘s economic system were besides absent. By the terminal of the decennary it was already clear that this state of affairs was extremely inefficient and unstable. What was observed after the alteration of political power in 1999 was that president Putin pushed Russia in a instead different way towards capitalist economy – viz. , through a strong signifier of state-led capitalist economy ( Lane, 2008 ) .
In the context of post-Soviet passage, a state-led capitalist construction implies that Russia ‘s economic system operates on the footing of cooperation between the province, the market and competitory and concerted economic establishments, similar to Western economic systems. However, the function of the market remains limited, while the province assumes a regulatory function and creates the necessary establishments. Furthermore, in a state-led capitalist construction ownership is allocated to both government-run and private concerns, which operate in cooperation with fiscal establishments ( Kohli, 2004 ; Lane, 2000 ) . Kohli ( 2004 ) describes cohesive-capitalist provinces, which create of import linkages with society ‘s major economic groups in chase of economic growing. Examples of such authorities constructions in other developing states include Korea under Park Chung Hee and Brazil during Estado Novo. The justification behind the acceptance of such a construction ( alternatively of importing an Anglo-American capitalist theoretical account ) is that it better fits local Russian economic and political conditions, hence proves to be more stable and sustainable in the medium tally. Furthermore, this ‘tailored ‘ construction can break warrant economic accretion ( in footings of GDP growing and factor accretion ) , since the cooperation between province and concern allows rents earned from assorted industries to be better channelled by the province ( Lane, 2000 ) .
The positive alterations observed on Russia ‘s economic skyline ( as described above ) have occurred after president Putin assumed power and introduced policies rather different from what Yeltsin ‘s disposal had envisaged. Once the mystifier of reforms is put together, it presents the new face that capitalist economy has assumed in Russia. The province still maintains a significant grade of ownership in most sectors of the economic system and remains powerful when it comes to its influence on private endeavor. However, it besides actively creates and stimulates employment, enforces the regulation of jurisprudence and ensures that comprehensive public assistance is achieved and maintained. In fact, under president Putin the state has had a functioning signifier of capitalist economy for the first clip since the autumn of the Soviet Union, which meets all the above characteristics of state-led capitalist economy ( Lane, 2008 ) . Furthermore, the analysis suggests that this consolidation of province power and the ensuing political stabilization have exerted a positive impact on the overall concern conditions in the state. The debut of a new state-led capitalist economy, tailored to suit local state conditions, has been followed by an addition in overall concern assurance, therefore profiting both the SMEs and big endeavors in Russia ( Hanson, 2004 ; Rutland, 2005b ; Sakwa, 2008 ) .
However, the response that Russia ‘s new capitalist construction has generated throughout the West has by and large been negative. The success achieved in footings of transforming large concerns, guaranting revenue enhancement aggregation, and wealth accretions are frequently presented as ‘despite ‘ Putin ‘s autocratic aspirations ( Shlapentokh, 2009 ) . Furthermore, Putin ‘s disposal is frequently accused of its going from democracy and its alleged violation of the rules of ‘good administration ‘ ( for illustration in Letiche, 2007 ) . However, such ideological accusals are unsurprising, since they are mirrored by Putin ‘s going from the nucleus thoughts of the Washington Consensus. In fact, this exchange bears much resemblance to the instead doubting Anglo-American response to China ‘s state-led development programs and gradualist attack to socio-economic reform.
Since the late seventiess China has pursued a really cautious and gradualist attack towards reform, defying foreign force per unit areas for rapid alteration. However, a big organic structure of western scientists, to a great extent embodied in the spirit of the Washington Consensus, expressed a profound pessimism towards this attack. During the 1990s, the Chinese Communist party was deemed unable to take the reforms, while the assurance in Russia and its acceptance of neoliberalism was overpowering. No western observer could hold so predicted the accomplishments of China, which are so obvious today. Thirty old ages of unbelievable success of Chinese policies in virtually every facet of development have revealed that the most dynamic facet of capitalist globalization has occurred under the leading of the Chinese Communist party ( Nolan, 1995 ) .
And while the grade of province engagement observed presently in Russia is beyond the degrees deemed acceptable in laissez-fair economic systems, this essay argues that, on the footing of the betterments discussed above, province trust is a more sustainable way towards Russia ‘s economic development. It represents a return towards a more outstanding function of the province, hence a more cautious and guided attack to development ( Lane, 2006 ) . Therefore, in this aspect Russia ‘s new way strongly resembles China ‘s transmutation based on gradualist and guided policies implemented since the 70s. Furthermore, such a strong Russian province is necessary to supply a more solid footing for the operation of little enterprisers and is particularly of import to operationalise and beef up the state ‘s big endeavors ( Ottung, 2004 ) .
Finally, the above analysis does non connote this peculiar type of state-led capitalist economy presently achieved in Russia is the end-form of capitalist construction that, one time in operation, should hence be maintained. This essay merely argues that regardless of whether the state makes a passage towards a different, western-type capitalist economy in the hereafter, the current construction is surely a good measure along the manner. Furthermore, it is a better option of political and economic administration, given the state ‘s history, local conditions and concern features. So far, the striking contrast between the state ‘s development during the first and the 2nd decennary of its passage has suggested that a system of state-led capitalist economy is surely more good for the SMEs every bit good as the large concerns.
The Washington Consensus forms the basis of modern globalization and it is along these neoliberal lines that the first effort to globalize Russia after decennaries of province socialism were made. The acceptance of Anglo-American neoliberalism meant that Russia had to quickly destruct its current economic and political base and build capitalist economy through industrial and belongings re-organisation. However, this left the state lawless and indebted, non at all comparable to a modern capitalist system. It was merely in the 2nd decennary of Russia ‘s passage – after the alteration of administrative power, that the economic state of affairs started to demo marks of betterment in footings of existent GDP per capita and criterion of life.
The extremist difference between the first and 2nd decennary of passage is the province ‘s attack towards building a capitalist construction. Putin formed a stronger province, re-imposed ordinance on the oligarchic elite and stimulated the market through import permutation and ordinance ( Ottung, 2004 ; Lane 2008 ) . In other words, he constructed a state-led capitalist construction ( resembling that of China and Korea ) , turn outing that the fatal error of the Washington Consensus was to separate economic and societal policy while disregarding local social conditions and establishments.
While the effort to import Anglo-American capitalist economy had detrimental effects, Russia is presently on a more effectual and suited way towards economic development. Adopting a state-led capitalist system allows the authorities to exercise influence over the private sector and develop the state ‘s industrial and concern potency. In add-on, Putin ‘s scheme has improved the state ‘s institutional model, therefore profiting non merely the large concerns but SMEs every bit good. The latter have enjoyed more policy protection and revenue enhancement benefits, while the former have been transformed into legitimate concerns. Putin displayed a instead independent authorization and worked towards distancing the concern barons form the political power ( Maury and Liljeblom, 2009 ) .
By turning its dorsum on this peculiar challenge of globalization to import a blueprint capitalist construction that performed good and delivered elsewhere, but proved extremely inefficient within the Russian post-communist scene, Russia in fact established itself as a more outstanding histrion within the procedure of globalization. Bing a developing state in a globalising universe, Russia had a weak political, economic and societal substructure ( Lane, 2000 ) , which pointed towards the demand for self-asserting presidential power and a balanced combination of market forces and province coordination of the economic system.
Furthermore, this should non needfully be considered as the terminal signifier of capitalist economy that the state has achieved and should therefore maintain. Regardless of whether Russia makes a successful passage to an Anglo-American ( or another Western type ) capitalist theoretical account in the hereafter, the current construction of state-led capitalist economy is surely an appropriate way towards the state ‘s development.
Finally, at the clip when Russia ‘s passage way was foremost determined ( in the 1990s ) many writers suggested that importing Anglo-American capitalist economy was the right manner frontward towards development. Very few writers acknowledged the potency of alternate paths such as the Chinese state-guided policies and the ability of the Communist party to present reforms ( alternatively, popular positions demanded that it should be overthrown ) . And while, the possibility for Russia to develop its ain capitalist system tailored to state specificities remained ignored throughout the 90s, modern twenty-four hours Russia has become cogent evidence for the possibility to implement such a system which is functional. Unfortunately it besides constitutes a cogent evidence that merely importing design policy bundles is bound to be debatable. This can be taken as a lesson for developing states in their journey towards capitalist economy.