How valid is the claim that in 1914 provinces went to war due to fear instead so motivations of addition? Austria’s wrangle. Germany’s warOne of the theories about the eruption of the First World War is that states went to war non to needfully derive something but chiefly because of fright which caused by many different factors.
Europe before the war can be compared to a round-about with the states involved. Germany being the cardinal pole. rushing up and therefore doing the states into unmanageable pandemonium ensuing in them interrupting off.
The footing of the confederation systems started organizing every bit early as 1871. France and Russia had been supportive of each other of all time since France Lent Russia money to get down industrialisation during the reign of Alexander II. The bond between these two great powers was strengthened by their shared enemies. the Cardinal Powers. Their grounds to hold on such confederation. nevertheless. were really different.
After the Franco-Prussian war of 1871. in which France lost Alsace and Lorraine. both rich in coal and Fe militias to the Prussians. there was a acrimonious. vindictive feeling in France-Revanchism. The Gallic believed it was their right to contend a winning war against Germany and recover Alsace and Lorraine. Germany was cognizant of this and Bismarck demanded 5 billion francs as war reparations. believing that this penalty will stultify France for old ages. Bismarck was. nevertheless. no economic expert. and Germany was to fear France of all time since 1873. when last francs were handed over to Germany.
“German acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine meant that there must be a war between Germany and France” Karl MarxAt the Algeciras conference in Spain. about all great powers and other states decided to back up the Gallic rights in Morocco during the First Moroccan crisis. go forthing Germany without any possible Alliess except for Austria-Hungary. This ‘conspiracy’ against Germany led to her fright of blockade and their confederation. hence. was non because of strong common understanding or the Gross Deutschland ideal. but merely due to this fright of encirclement- Austria-Hungary was the lone option.
As Germany was comparatively immature. full of energy. aspirations. and chiefly a respect-wanting state. its chief possible gain- if a war was to interrupt out- would be widening its colonial imperium. This is apprehensible when we realize that in the nineteenth century power. regard and an imperium were tightly tied together.
“From now nil will go on in the universe without Germany and its Kaiser” Wilhelm IIGermany already had some settlements. but this figure was comparatively little and surely non large plenty to fulfill its aspirations. But even for these settlements a naval forces was necessary. Therefore. under Admiral Tirpitz. the great betterment of the German naval forces began with the end of protecting their existent and possible settlements. However. it was obvious that the chief end is to badger Britain.
This turned out to work good ; Britain had ever been dependent on its naval forces as it was the best and lone manner of maintaining all prospective menaces off from the islands. It could non afford to allow Germany develop its naval forcess so drastically. particularly because of Germany’s strategic place by the North Sea where Britain had her weakest point. This accumulated with Kaiser’s haughtiness ( particularly Realpolitik- accomplishes the end no affair how- slayings. blackmail… ) and gawky political relations ( The Daily Telegraph matter ) ensuing in a strongly anti-German felling in Britain.
Except for her colonial aspirations. another end that would come out of a war for Germany was what Von Moltke called “an immediate. preventative war against France and Russia” . since Russia was be aftering on increasing her ground forces from 1. 5 to 2. 0 million.
Except for the menace of German naval forces. Britain was non affected by the actions on the continent excessively much- and it did non desire to acquire affected. It remained in “Splendid isolationism” as Britain’s attitude towards continental Europe was described by Lord Salisbury.
“English policy is to drift lazily downstream. on occasion seting out a diplomatic boathook to avoid hits. ” Lord Salisbury.
As Britain did non hold much to derive from a war with the Central powers. it was non clear until the last minutes whether it will lodge to its promise and fall in the war on the Gallic side.
In the terminal. nevertheless. the British found something profitable in the war. There were many protests in Britain as socialist parties were emerging. Ireland besides wanted its ain regulation and first suffragettes appeared. A short. successful war would hold been a good manner of traveling the focal point of the society on something else. The obvious possible addition was destructing German navy and doing a halt to its growing. This was. on the other manus. excessively hazardous. as this could bring down large harm to the British naval forces.
Slavs looked up to Russia as the female parent of all Slavs ( this is called Panslavism ) . The end of most Slavonic patriots. progressives and intellectuals at the clip was to organize a province in which all Slavs would populate together. This really much concerned Austria-Hungary. Germany’s chief ally. as many Slavic states were included in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It besides had its ain aspirations in the Balkans ( appropriation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 ) . Austria was worried as Serbia was turning stronger and stronger. desiring to organize a province similar to subsequently Yugoslavia. Russia supported this Serbian battle. With Austria-Hungary and her support of the Central powers on one side and Russia with French. and possibly even British support on the other. the Balkans formed a perfect struggle site.
“We have to oppress Serbia like a viper” Austrian commanding officer in head.
Austria-Hungary and Germany therefore had grounds for their little paranoia. As and add-on to this served the image of barbarian hosts from the steppes of Asia. bear downing the civilised cardinal Europe. This splanchnic fright and the fact that with the population of 166 million people. Russia had practically limitless human power militias ( and would be hence practically undefeatable if there were an equal sum of equipment ) made Russia itself the biggest fright of the Central Powers. as proved by the Schlieffen program. which stated that it was necessary to concentrate on Russia after rapidly get the better ofing France.
“We can non vie with the Russian multitudes. ” Von MoltkeA perfect illustration of the fact that states went to war largely because of fright and non derive is first war declaration. This was caused by the Russian mobilisation. which was a reaction to German aggression towards Prussia. Russia. nevertheless. was for now non traveling to predate any farther so a mobilisation. But fear and confusion led the Germans into the certainty that Russia is about to assail. German mobilisation was so the obvious following measure. and The Great War was about to get down.
States hence did travel to war because of fright of different issues. But it must be remembered that without any position of net income. there would non be anything to fear in the first topographic point. For illustration. France’s addition would be Germany’s loss and therefore grounds for war for all states included both addition and fright facets. It is. nevertheless. obvious that the many misreckonings of chiefly. but non merely. the German authorities caused terrible confusion and uncertainness about who is really the one in control. doing this to ensue in the laterality of fright grounds.
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